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ABSTRACT
It is argued that the reason for the ills of irrigation management is the alienation of
farmers from the process of planning and implementation. Often 'lack of political will'
is identified as the main reason for the tardy progress in irrigation reforms at the state
level. Andhra Pradesh has demonstrated the political will by initiating widespread
irrigation reforms through legislation. This paper, based on the situation after six
years of WUAs in existence, makes an attempt to provide a comprehensive view on
the status and functioning of the Water Users' Associations in the State. It is argued
that while substantial amounts of money were spent on the reform process, the
money was used mainly for improving the ailing irrigation systems rather than
strengthening the formal institutional structures. Though some benefits in terms of
increased area under irrigation in canal systems and improved quality of irrigation is
evident, the sustainability of these benefits is rather uncertain in the absence of
efficient institutional structures.
Despite the fact that WUAs are promoted as non-political institutions, 'elite capture'
and political involvement dominate their functioning. And the present trend appears
to be towards further politicization of these institutions. More importantly, even after
six years of their existence devolution of powers to WUAs has not taken place, as
most of the important functions like assessment, collection of water charges,
sanctioning of works, etc., are still in the hands of the irrigation department. In the
absence of devolution of powers the WUAs are aiming for political gains rather than
improving the systems. It is argued that political will is a necessary but not a sufficient
condition for making the WUAs autonomous and self-sufficient. Restructuring and
reforming of the State irrigation departments and the bureaucracy is critical for effective
and sustainable irrigation institutions.
* This paper is based on a larger study titled, "Formalising Irrigation Institutions: A study of
Water User Associations in Andhra Pradesh". Financial support from the National
Agricultural Technology Project (NATP), ICAR is gratefully acknowledged.
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C.H.Hanumantha Rao and Prof. R.S.Deshpande and Dr. Madar Samad for their comments
and suggestions on the report and this paper is drawn. However, the usual disclaimers
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I Background
Judicious management of water resources is among the critical policy issues
across the continents. The need for action in this direction is growing, as
countries and communities across the globe are increasingly experiencing
water stress. The growing water stress represents culmination of gross
neglect and mis-management of water resources over the years. For, the
problem is not due to absolute shortage of water, but due to the absence
of proper mechanisms for conservation, distribution and efficient use.
Realising the importance, irrigation development policy has undergone
changes across the globe during the last ten years. As Meinzen-Dick, et.
al (1997) point out that the earlier approaches to irrigation development
were based on the assumption that a combination of "correct" technology,
"efficient" markets, and "capable" agencies (government departments) would
yield best possible results. These approaches were found ineffective in the
absence of decentralization and devolution of powers to the users. It is now
widely recognized that appropriate institutional arrangements involving
farmers and other stakeholders is critical for sustainable water resource
management.
A growing body of literature documents the role of farmers' organizations
in irrigation management and agricultural development. It is the social system
that ultimately determines how productively the water flowing through the
irrigation system will be managed. These social systems may be traditional
forms of farmer organization or more contemporary forms such as the
Water Users' Associations (WUAs). Vermillion (1996) observed that farmer
management of public irrigation systems would enhance their performance
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and bring about wide-ranging socio-economic changes that would enable
farmers to substantially improve farm income besides improving cost-
effectiveness of operation and maintenance. Though global experience with
irrigation management transfer is far from uniform, especially in low-income
societies, it has shown some success in countries like Philippines, Mexico,
Chile, Australia, etc (Saleth and Dinar, 2004).
The central and State governments of independent India inherited the idea
that most water rights belong to the State (Stone, 1984). But this trend has
been changed in recent years where, many State governments have adopted
the principle of participatory irrigation management through government
orders. The Command Area Development (CAD) programme, operational
since 1973, became the major effort towards improving water use efficiency
and productivity of irrigated agriculture. During the second half of 1990s,
number of States in India had transferred the irrigation management
responsibilities to WUAs or private/NGO contractors. In most of the cases,
full transfer of powers has taken place as far as responsibilities are concerned
(O&M, water distribution, fee collection, etc), while only partial transfer has
taken place in the case of assessment, assured water supply, etc.
In Andhra Pradesh, Irrigation and Command Area Development (CAD) Act
that was enacted in the year 1984 imposed the creation of command area
development authorities and ‘Pipe Committees’. These ‘Pipe Committees’
proved to be quite ineffective as the delivery of water at the outlet was quite
unrealistic leaving no scope to the pipe committees to effect any improvement
in the distribution of water. Pipe Committees had no role in the maintenance
and their responsibilities were not defined and hence were non-functional
(Joshi, 1997). The State through another act in the year 1997 called "The
Andhra Pradesh Farmers’ Management of Irrigation" created a three-tier
WUA system at hydraulic level, Distributory Committee and Project Committee.
More than 10,000 WUAs have been formed with a clearly specified
responsibilities and powers. A provision was also made to provide financial
assistance for those WUAs that enhance water fee collections in their
commands (Brewer, et al. 1999).
Most of the studies available on the experience of WUAs are early
assessments, as the process of implementation was just falling in line.
These studies provide mixed assessment of the WUAs and the impact5
appears to differ between canal WUAs and tank WUAs1. The WUAs are
expected to be financially self sufficient, socially stronger and politically
united to manage the systems efficiently in the medium to long term (above
5 years). Against this backdrop, this paper, based on the situation after six
years of WUAs in existence, makes an attempt to provide a comprehensive
view on the status and functioning of the Water Users' Associations in the
State of Andhra Pradesh.
II Setting
The A. P. Farmers' Management of Irrigation Systems Act was enacted in
1997. Following this the elections were conducted in June 1997 to WUAs
for all major, medium and minor schemes. In November 1997, elections to
the distributory committees were also completed. It was proposed (1997)
that project level committees would also be constituted soon in order to
effect total transfer of management to the farmers' organisations. The main
objectives of the WUAs act include: i) realising the maximum irrigation
potential, ii) ensuring equitable and reliable supplies, iii) improving the
efficiency of the existing irrigation network, and iv) managing water resources
better through stakeholder participation and withdraw the department from
O & M. Under this act, upto March 2000, 10,292 WUAs have been registered
(Table 1). Of these, elections for 9,800 WUAs were conducted and these
WUAs were formalised by March 2000. Elections were not conducted in 492
WUAs for various reasons such as stay orders from court or the government.
Interestingly, elections were unanimous in majority of the cases (Jairath,
2001). Elections for the second term were conducted during 2003, though
not in all the WUAs. Second term elections were conducted in all but nine
districts and in about 4,564 out of the total 10,790 WUAs. Elections were
postponed in nine districts2. The main reason given was that there was no
water in the canals, especially in the Nagarjuna Sagar command area.
About 80 percent of these WUAs are in minor systems. The evolution of
water user associations is mainly facilitated by the A. P. Economic restructuring
project (irrigation component) funded  (Rs.4,994 crores) mainly by World
1 To capture both the views see Pangare (2002), Jairath, (2001), Parthasarathy and Joshi
(2001), Raju (2001), Reddy (1998) and Peter and Pingle (1999).
2
 These districts include Anantapur, Cuddapah, Guntur, Khammam, Krishna, Kurnool,
Nalgonda, Nellore and Prakasam. Besides, elections for 22 WUAs in West Godavari and
11 WUAs in Chittoor are with held.6
Bank, NABARD and through the Accelerated Irrigation Benefit Programme
(AIBP) of Government of India.
Table 1: District / Sector Wise WUAs (as on 23/03/2000)
Name of the Total No. of WUAs Total Elections Total Elec- Total
District Notified Notified conducted (6+7 tions No. of
(2+3+4) +8) to be WUAs
Major Medi- Minor Major Medi- Minor Held (9+10)
um um
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Adilabad* 35 27 221 283 35 27 212 274 9 283
Anantapur 46 7 305 358 46 7 302 355 3 358
Chittoor 0 51 644 695 0 48 616 664 31 695
Cuddapah 74 8 276 358 74 8 259 341 70 358
E. Godavari# 106 12 225 343 106 12 215 333 10 343
Guntur 245 8 81 334 239 8 76 323 11 334
Karimnagar 249 10 586 845 249 10 571 83 15 845
Khammam 51 5 181 237 50 5 180 235 2 237
Krishna 189 12 288 489 166 12 256 434 55 489
Kurnool 116 12 153 281 114 12 145 271 10 281
M.Nagar 21 31 478 530 21 29 473 523 7 530
Medak 0 12 585 597 0 12 551 563 34 597
Nalgonda 91 45 541 677 91 44 541 678 1 677
Nellor 110 58 695 863 100 57 612 769 94 863
Nizamabad^ 78 13 267 358 78 13 228 319 39 358
Prakasam 124 5 317 446 113 4 291 408 38 446
Rangareddy 0 3 165 168 0 2 165 167 1 168
Srikakulam 37 28 459 524 37 28 442 507 17 524
Visakha** 28 18 375 421 28 18 349 415 6 421
Vizianagaram 0 22 439 461 0 21 422 443 18 461
Warangal 29 18 683 730 28 18 623 669 61 730
W. Godavari 71 6 217 294 70 6 205 281 13 294
Total 1700 411 8181 10292 1645 401 7754 9800 492 10292
Notes: *Includes 9 WUAs under Vattivagu & Chelamalavagu.
**Includes Tandava (Part Only)
#Includes 12 WUAs under Tandava
^Includes 7 WUAs under Koulsanala, conduct of elections signifies completion of the formalities
of WUAs.
Source: Department of irrigation, Govt. of Andhra Pradesh.
Institutional Structure 3
As per the act all the surface irrigation schemes, major, medium and minor,
are covered under the programme. Only the schemes under the Panchayati
Raj institutions and all minor water bodies in the scheduled areas of Andhra
Pradesh are not covered. Command area of the project has been delineated
3   For more details see Pangare (2002); Jairath (2001) and Raju (2000).7
on hydraulic basis that was administratively and functionally viable. Each
farmers’ organisation was expected to have even number of territorial
constituencies or committees (TC) within the WUA. Area covered by each
constituency depends on the nature of the project and size of the command
area. It ranges between 150 and 250 hectares in the case of major and
medium projects and between less than 50 and 200 hectares in the case of
minor irrigation projects. Each TC will have an area between 250 and 600
hectares. The area under the WUA ranges from 250 to 3500 hectares. The
area will be much less in the case of minor systems. Depending on the type
of irrigation scheme, one to three tier systems of associations / committees
will be in place. Each Assistant Engineer will be in-charge for a maximum
area of 4445 ha and four to five times of this area would be under a Deputy
Engineer. The basic structure of the PIM is presented in Figure 1.
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Water User Associations are the primary structures of irrigation water users.
Number of WUAs under each scheme depends on the size of the irrigation
scheme, which ranges from one to a few hundreds of WUAs across the
schemes. The main role of WUAs is to regulate and distribute water within
its command area. The total command area will be divided into 4-10 Water
User (WU) constituencies. Each WU constituency will elect a member of the
WUAs managing committee and directly elect the president of the WUA. All
the landholders, title holders as well as tenants, within localised / authorised
area are members of the WUAs with voting rights. All other water users will
be co-opted members without voting rights. A group of WUAs under a
distributory or a small group of distributaries comprises a distributory
committee (DC), which will look after the distributory related issues. All the
WUA Presidents are members of the DC and they elect the managing
committee and the president of the DC. All the DC Presidents will be members
of the project committees (PC). PCs are in-charge of the entire project
command area, which is often divided in to 7-11 constituencies. The members
of the PC will elect the president and 7-11 managing committee members
from each constituency. Above all, an apex committee headed by the minister
for major and medium projects shall be constituted to formulate broad
policy guidelines and to resolve the disputes.
The election procedure of the WUAs has been changed in the year 2003.
According to the new procedure: There are twelve territorial WU
constituencies in each of the Water User Association of Major and medium
irrigation systems and six in the case of minor irrigation systems. Every
WUA shall consist of the following members:
l All the water users who are land holders in water users area,
l All other water users co-opted in a water user area
l Members specified above shall constitute the general body for a Water
Users’ Association
l A person eligible to become a member of more than one territorial
constituency of a water user associations under above shall be  entitled
to be a member of only one territorial constituency and he/she shall
exercise his/her option of membership
l Members specified above shall alone have the right to vote9
There shall be a Managing Committee for each Water User Association,
comprising members of the Territorial constituencies elected directly by the
water users from their respective Territorial constituencies. The managing
committee for water users association shall be a continuous body, with one
third of its members retiring every two years. The term of the office of the
members of the Territorial Constituencies is expected to be six years from
the date of first meeting of the Managing Committee (Provided that at the
first election, all the territorial constituency members shall be elected at one
time, out of which, one third of the members thereof shall retire as soon as
may be on the completion of two years, another one third members are
expected to retire after completion of four years, and the remaining one
third shall retire after completion of six years in office and their terms of
retirement shall be decided by drawl of lots.)
An ordinary election is to be held for the purpose of constituting water
users associations in major, medium and minor irrigation systems. The
election of Territorial constituency members, President and the vice-president
of the water users association may be either through raising of hands or
through voting slips. The Election officer shall ascertain the opinion of the
voters present in respect of their choice of electing the president whether
by rising of hands or through voting slips. The election officer shall follow
one of the above two methods as agreed upon by the majority of the voters
present. The president and the vice-president of the managing committee
of water users association shall, if not recalled or removed or disqualified
by the provisions of the Act, be in office for a period of two years from the
date of election or his tenure as member of territorial constituency, which
ever is earlier.
Functions of these bodies include preparation of operational plans at the
beginning of each season, maintain an inventory of irrigation systems such
as tanks, ponds, wells, etc., within the command area, maintenance of
records, plan and execute the distributory and drainage systems
maintenance, water budgeting, resource mobilisation, conflict resolution,
etc. One interesting feature of the WUAs is the right to recall the president
if his functioning is not satisfactory. The general body can remove him with
one-third majority. However, the institutional structure misses out on some
important aspects that are necessary for the success and sustainability of
the institutions. There is an in-built bias against minor irrigation, as the10
minister for major and medium irrigation is heading the apex committee
though there is separate ministry for minor irrigation. The apex committee
provides the broad policy frame and hence it is but natural to favour major
irrigation. This may reflect in the performance of the WUAs in the two
sectors. All the rights in WUAs are given to land owning and tenant cultivators
to the neglect of land less and other water users such as land less women,
fishermen, etc. This denies equitable access to a common pool resource.
As a result, the huge public investments in this sector benefit only a section
of the community, though in majority. Equal distribution of water rights is
seen as vital for sustaining water institutions (Deshpande and Reddy, 1990).
Financial Aspects
The whole process is funded through external funding. Under the Andhra
Pradesh Economic Restructuring Programme each WUA and DC got Rs. 50
per acre during the first year (1998-99) and Rs. 100 per acre in the second
year (1999-00). Of this, WUAs at the minor level get 60 percent, DC gets
20 percent and PC gets 20 percent share. Though the allocations look
small on per acre basis, at the aggregate level, this could be any where
between Rs. 50,000 to 8,00,000 per WUA in the canal commands. Where
as in the case of tank WUAs, the amount would be below Rs. 5000 per
WUA in majority of the cases. During the year 1998-99 Rs. 1070 million
were spent of which Rs. 1030 million were spent just in 45 days. This has
led to rent-seeking attitude at the department level as every bill has to be
passed by the accounts officer before going to the WUA. Besides, every
year WUAs in the major canal commands receive Rs. 200 per acre (Rs.100
per acre for WUA and Rs. 100 per acre for the DC). Under this, during
1999-2000 Krishna delta got Rs. 123.6 million; Nagarjuna Sagar left canal
Rs. 60 million; medium projects got Rs. 3 million; and minor projects got Rs.
10.4 million (Raju, 2000). Moreover, in the canal WUAs entire money is
spent on repairing the distributory network while in the case of tank WUAs
tanks as well as the distributaries requiring more investment for restoration.
Present funding when compared to the actual requirement for tank restoration
is grossly inadequate (see later section). This clearly reflects the bias in
favour of canal WUAs.
As indicated earlier the PIM programme is entirely funded by external sources.
Though user contribution of 15 percent is imbibed in the PIM act there is11
no evidence of any contribution from farmers so far. In fact, there are no
efforts to collect this contribution. However, it is expected that WUAs would
become self-sufficient over time through hike in water rates coupled with
better recovery. As a first step water rates were raised by 3 times during
1996-97 (Table 2). After the revision, it was reported, water fee collection
has increased by 9 percent from 54 percent to 65 percent during 1997-98
(Raju, 2000). But, this is not reflected in any way in the budget figures
during or after the year 1997-98 (Reddy, 2003). Such idiosyncrasies could
be due to the absence of devolution of powers to the WUA level. As per
the act, WUAs are expected to become self sufficient in managing their
affairs. They are expected to assess the command area and collect the
water cess. Since the entire fee is retained at WUA, DC, PC and local body
level there is no incentive for under reporting of area. The proposed revenue
sharing pattern is presented in Table 3. The first step in this direction was
initiated during the year (2001-2002) though the approach is cautious.
Initially, the plan was to plough back 50 percent of the revenue collected
to WUAs (25 percent) and DCs (25 percent). But, irrigation department is
still carrying out the collection of water charges. The impact of this new
system is yet to reflect in the data. However, it is a long way before the
devolution of financial power takes place. Till then the PIM in Andhra Pradesh
would have to sustain, which is the main focus of this study.
Table 2: Revised Water Rates for Different Crop Categories
Crop Category Type of source wise water rates
per acre in Rs.
Category I Category II
Old New Old New
1. First / Single wet crop 60 200 40 100
2. 2nd and 3rd wet crop 60 150 40 100
3. 1st crop irrigated dry 40 100 20 60
4. 2nd and 3
rd irrigated dry crop 40 100 20 60
5. Two-season crops per year 120 350 80 350
6. Aquaculture per year 00 500 00 500
Note: old rates with effect from July 1986 and the new rates from July 1996.
Source: APERP Project Implementation Plan, 1998.12
Table 3: Proposed Revenue Sharing Pattern among the PIM Structures
(Percent of total)
Level Major Medium Minor
Water User Association (WUA) 50 60 90
Distributory Committee (DC) 20 30 ---
Project Committee (PC) 20 --- ---
Local Government 10 10 10
III Framework and Approach
Collective action framework is the most appropriate to study and understand
the Common Pool Resources (CPRs) situations. Several authors have
documented the case studies of CPRs and other rural institutions. Different
approaches are used to explain various institutional arrangements existing
in rural areas. These approaches include: property rights approach, game
theoretic approach, transaction costs and limited information approach of
new institutional economics. Property rights approach focuses on different
institutional arrangements- ranging from private property rights to common
property rights.  The property rights school argues that private property
rights, rather than community property rights, would result in an efficient
allocation of resources and their management, while there is enough empirical
evidence to support the contrary. The game theoretic approach emphasizes
understanding the individual's behaviors and the strategies followed in various
CPR situations. The new institutional economics, unlike neo-classical
economics, treats institutions as central to development process and explain
their growth and efficiency in terms of transaction costs. However, none of
these approaches on own seem to explain the diverse CPR situations
characterized by the complex attributes of collective action in developing
economies like India.  The main bottleneck of these approaches is their
emphasis on individual rationality while CPR management is based on
collective action. Recent attempts to provide a theoretical framework for
collective action have tried to draw support from various disciplines and put
it under the framework of Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD)
(Ostrom, Gardner and Walker, 1994; Bromley, 1992; Ostrom, 1990). This
approach is comprehensive and, in fact, fairly successful in explaining the
success stories of collective action situation and has led to a shift in focus
away from the so-called "tragedy of the commons".  However, given the13
limited number of successful cases compared to failures makes it a specific
rather than a general framework. More importantly, though it explains the
institutional sustainability part very well, its applicability is limited as far as
institutional innovation and changes are concerned. The latter are equally
important, if not more, for understanding institutional success and failure in
CPR management.
Number of studies tried to explain the causes of poor performance of WUA
through identifying the factors that characterise successful WUAs (for a
detailed review of studies see Meizen-Dick, 1997). These studies identify,
among other factors, social capital, group size, homogeneity, leadership,
operational rules, etc., as important factors in explaining the success stories.
The existing theories of collective action are based on these success stories.
Moreover, they have not helped much in formulating policies for effective
participatory irrigation management (PIM). It is observed: "Currently dominant
institutional-economic models fail to grasp the cultural specifics of irrigation
as social practice and are a poor guide to the meanings and motivations
of local institutional development" (Mosse, 2003, p.287). While the evolution
of PIM may depend on policy support and external funding, it sustainability
critically hinges on the effective support from the political networks and
irrigation bureaucracy. "PIM cannot become a reality nor it become self
sustaining without restructuring of the State irrigation departments. However,
the irrigation bureaucracy is unlikely to initiate such change. The record of
last 20 years standing against it" (Singh, 2000, p.698). Historically WUAs
are political institutions (Mosse, 2003). Local leaders compete for control
over these institutions, as these new institutions tend to become financially
stronger. The situations do not vary much between resources (irrigation or
watershed development) or locations (Tamilnadu or Andhra Pradesh) (Mosse,
2003; Reddy, 2003). As Bardhan (2004) puts it "In most poor countries,
there are massive costs of collective action in building new economic
institutions and political coalitions, and in breaking the deadlock of incumbent
interests threatened by new technologies" (p.481). Therefore, evolving,
sustaining and replicating WUAs or PIM is not easy given the socio-cultural
and political dynamics in countries like India. The present study analyse the
issues at hand in the collective action framework.
This study is carried out at theoretical as well as empirical levels.  As a first
step, a thorough review of literature on participatory development and14
collective action in the context of natural resource management in general
and irrigation in particular was carried out. This review is used as a
background for drawing testable insights and hypotheses as a second step.
Finally, the empirical analyses are used to verify the hypotheses and develop
a more generalized and practicable framework for irrigation management.
At the empirical level, our approach is to study the problem extensively as
well as intensively. At the extensive level a sample of 222 WUAs were
selected from 22 districts (10 WUAs in each district) in the State (see
presented appendix table 1). A detailed schedule was canvassed among
these 222 WUAs in order to examine their structure and functioning. At the
intensive level a sample of 6 WUAs representing the three agro-climate
regions of the State viz, Coastal Andhra, Rayalaseema and Telangana
regions were selected (Table 1.4). The selection was purposive to cover the
canal and tank systems, though the selection of districts was based on the
concentration of WUAs in each category (canal and tank). From each WUA
a sample of fifty farmers, representing head-middle-tail ends of the distributory
systems and different socio-economic sections of the community was drawn
using the probability proportionate sampling method for an in-depth survey.
In all 300 farmers will be studied intensively using the survey method with
the help of a detailed household level schedule. Prior to the sample survey
Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) exercises were conducted in the sample
villages in order to draw qualitative inferences about the village community.
PRA was also helpful in designing the questionnaire. Besides, focus group
interviews were held with the office bearers of the WUAs and irrigation
department officials.
IV Structure, Organisation and Functioning of WUAs
The composition of WUA members reflects not only the socio-economic
milieu of the community but also the political economy dimensions of the
institutional innovation and development. In the sample WUAs the executive
members are spread evenly across socio-economic groups in terms of their
representation in the committee in relation to their actual population. In fact,
the lower social and economic groups have better representation in the
WUA executive. But, in the case of the highest position (the President), they
are grossly under represented. The large farmers and upper castes usually
hold the position of the President (Table 4). Their representation at the15
highest office clearly indicates the 'elite capture' syndrome. This reflects the
general picture pertaining to the recently evolved parallel institutions in the
state (Reddy and Jenkins, 2004). The 'elite capture' of parallel institutions
is attributed mainly to: a) elite are not able to get into Panchayat Raj bodies
due to reservation policy and, b) parallel institutions are financially stronger
than the PRIs.
Table 4: Socio-economic Composition of Executive Members in Canal
and Tank WUAs
Caste Canal Tank
President Mem- % to President Mem- % to
bers population bers population
Social Composition (%)
SC/ST 01 11 10 04 14 12
BC 11 32 30 43 54 52
OC 88 57 60 53 32 36
Economic Composition (%)
0.10-2.50 03 12 11 19 31 29
2.51-5.00 09 30 27 25 27 27
5.10-10.0 49 42 43 30 26 26
10.1&above 39 16 19 26 16 18
All 100 (1.2) 100 (0.1) 100 100 (1.4) 100 (2.5) 100
Note: Figures in brackets are proportion of females in the respective category.
Management of Funds
Average area per WUA varies across systems and locations. WUAs in the
head reaches are bigger in terms of command area and area irrigated
when compared to middle and tail end WUAs. Canal WUAs are larger than
tank WUAs by a factor of more than ten i.e., 4900 in the head reaches to
268 acres in the Tank WUAs. In most of the cases, area under WUA,
command area of WUA and area irrigated under WUA is co-terminus. The
size of WUA affects the fund allocations, as the fund allocations are on per
acre basis. While canal WUAs get anywhere between Rs. 2 to 3 lakhs per
year, the tank WUAs get between Rs. 50, 000 and 70,000 (Table 5). Tank
WUAs are getting more money per acre when compared to canal WUAs
due to the limited coverage of tank systems. While tank WUAs got about16
Rs. 200 per acre per year as against Rs.100/- in canal WUAs. Though tank
WUAs received substantially higher allocations (2-4 times in 6 years) when
compared to canal WUAs, the amounts are much lower than the requirement
for tank restoration. The estimates for repairs range between Rs. 3000 -
Rs. 7000 per acre depending on the tank size without desilting (Reddy,
2002). The low allocations are mainly due to the reason that funds are
allocated for canal repairs rather than restoration of tanks. This approach
suits well in the canal systems, as the major problem is canal maintenance.
Where as in the case of tank systems the length of the distributory canals
or feeder channels is not much. Moreover, the requirement of tank systems
is the repair of tanks in terms of repairing the breached bunds, de-silting,
etc. In the absence of funds for such activities tank WUAs may not be
effective.
Table 5: Source Wise Funds (in Rs.) to WUAs under Canal and Tank by
Location and Type (1997 to 2002)
Sources of Canal Tank
Funds
Head Middle Tail-end Irrigation Tank Percolation Tank
Per Per Per Per Per Per Per Per Per  Per
WUA acre WUA  acre WUA acre WUA acre WUA acre
(Irr. (Irr. (Irr. (Irr. (Irr.
Area) Area) Area) Area) Area)
Government 975921 199 1669620 485 916500 272 385276 1437 288201 1140
(48) (76)  (46) (90) (90)
Water-cess 283065 208 425435 124 601879 179 9851 37 3999 16
(50)  (19) (30) (02) (01)
Contribution 23441 5 33904 10) 69598 21 22051 82 20553 81
(02)  (02 (04) (05) (06)
Others 2804 0.60 61203 18 397521 118 12749 48 6432 25
(03) (20) (03) (03)
Total 1285231 412.6 2190162 637 1985498 590 429927 1604 319185 1262
(100) (100) (100) (100) (100)
Avg./year 214205 69 365027 106 330916 98 71655 267 53197 210
Note: Figures in brackets are respective percentages to total.
Major source of funding is from the government followed by water charges
allocated to WUAs. The share of water cess is about 50 percent in the case
of canal head reaches while it is 30 percent in tail ends and only 19 percent
in the middle reaches. In the case of tank WUAs government contributes
about 90 percent and the share of water charges is less than 2 percent.17
However, the difference between government contribution and water charges
is not clear as the sharing of water cess between the WUA and other
institutions was initiated only recently. Hence, these two categories could be
treated together as external funding. On the other hand, people's contribution
is less than 4 percent in the case of canal WUAs and less than 6 percent
in the case of tank WUAs. This clearly indicates that the mandatory 15
percent contribution in the works is not adhered to in the entire sample of
WUAs.
As mentioned earlier majority of the works pertain to repair of canals followed
by formation and rising the height of the bunds and removal of silt and
maintenance of structures (Table 6). In the case of canals, works mostly
pertain to canal cleaning and repairs (removal of silt and maintenance of
structures) followed by construction of culverts / check dams. In the case
of tanks, the distribution of works is more even across the type of works.
In terms of fund allocations, raising the height of tank bunds account for 42
percent of the expenditure followed by tank repairs and deepening.
Table 6: Works Carried-out and Expenditure Incurred in Canal and Tank
WUAs During the period 1997-2002
Type of Work %  of Works Carried out
Canal Tank Total
1. Repair of Canal/Tank pipelines 15 (1.5) 85 (13) 100 [95]
2. Digging/Repair of Canals/Tanks 39 (13) 61 (15) 100 [238]
3. Construction of Culvert/Check dams 34 (05) 66 (09) 100 [80]
4. Formation /raising the height of bunds 13 (03) 87 (42) 100 [182]
5. Cutting trees, plants/weeding 20 (01) 80 (05) 100 [45]
6. Deepening of Canals/Tanks 24 (08) 76 (13) 100 [96]
7. Formation of Ayacut/Tank bed road 67 (0.50) 33 (Neg.) 100 [3]
8. Removal of silt and maintenance of
Structures 88 (68) 12 (02) 100 [155]
Note: Figures in '( )' are respective shares in expenditure. Figures in '[ ]' are the total
number of works carried out.
Meetings and other functions
As per the guidelines two general body (GB) meetings should be held in a
year i.e., one each before starting of the kharif and the rabi seasons,18
whereas, the executive committee meets as and when necessary. During
the past six years (1997-2002) experience indicates that GB meetings were
not held twice a year and this could be due to lack of irrigation water in
some of the systems during the last two years. The frequency of EC meetings
was more in tail end WUAs followed by head and middle WUAs. This indicates
that middle reach WUAs face less number of problems when compared to
head and tail reaches. EC meetings are more frequent in the case of tank
WUAs. The Presidents of WUAs reported that participation (above 80 percent
in the case of canal and above 90 percent in the case of tank WUAs) and
co-operation (above 95 percent in canal and tank WUAs) of members in the
EC meetings is quite high. Even after six years of existence, the only activity
carried out predominantly by the WUAs is conducting the meetings (Figs 2
and 3). The only important activity in which the WUAs have a say in majority
of the cases is regarding the works.
The dominance of the department is clearly seen in the most important
aspects like assessment, fund allocation, cess collection and water
management, though the involvement of WUAs is better in the case of tank
WUAs (Fig. 3). Despite the promises the devolution of powers has not
taken place even in the case of land assessment, let alone fund allocation
and collection. This is one of the main bottlenecks for the sustenance of the
WUAs. On the other hand, the role of contractors appears to be marginal
even in the case of works. In the absence of devolution of powers there is
no clarity even on the part of WUA Presidents regarding the purpose and
role of WUAs. Only 40 percent of the Presidents are aware of the WUAs
role in the canal systems while 59 percent of them are aware in the case
of tank systems. Nevertheless, 90 percent of the Presidents in the case of
canals and 70 percent in the case of tanks endorse effectiveness of WUAs.
Devolution of more powers to the WUAs is expected to improve the
performance in 67 percent of the canal WUAs. On the other hand, repairs
to the main systems (tanks) would improve the performance in 60 percent
of tank WUAs. As per the relationships between the constitutional (Panchayati
Raj) and parallel (WUA) institutions they are cordial in more than 90 percent
of the cases. That is there are no conflicts, though they are not working in
tandem-a case of passive or indifferent attitude of the PRIs (Reddy and
Jankins, 2004).19
V Effectiveness of WUAs: Household Level Assessment
The aim of WUAs is to improve the water management system in terms of
equitable and just distribution of water, financial sustainability of the system,
promote self-management of the systems, etc. The macro picture indicated
that in their present state, the WUAs are far from achieving these objectives.
What emerged from the macro picture reflected the institutional strengths
and weakness of WUAs, but could not provide insights on the processes
and perceptions of the farmers pertaining to the effectiveness of the WUAs.





































Here an attempt is made to highlight these aspects. Though assessing the
economic impact of the WUAs is the ultimate test for its effectiveness,
economic impacts could not be assessed clearly due to water scarcity in the
systems.
Functioning and effectiveness of WUAs mostly depend on the process of
their evolution. Both pre and post implementation processes play an
important role in this regard. Our results indicate that very few farmers are
involved in the pre-planning phase of the WUAs, though a majority of them
expressed that the formation of WUAs is appropriate to solve the problems
of irrigation. The involvement of local community was much less in the
middle and tail reaches of canal system and almost zero in the case of tank
systems. In the absence of local community participation, the main lacuna
observed in the pre-planning process was: limited devolution of powers to
the WUAs and selection of good leaders. It is observed that caste, gender
and activity did not play an important role in the formation of WUAs. The
proportion of women members in the WUAs is also very marginal, as there
is no provision for reservation for them.
The awareness regarding the WUAs is quite high among the communities
(Table 7). Greater awareness in the tank communities could be due to the
smaller coverage, often pertaining to one village. Within the canal systems
the awareness is higher in the head reaches compared to middle and tail
reaches. Active participation in the activities is limited to a quarter of the
members.  Though elections are inherent in the design of the WUAs, elections
were hardly conducted in the case of canal systems. For, no voting took
place in any of the sample WUAs (Table 5). Presidents were unanimously
elected (nominated) in more than 80 percent of the cases in canal systems
as against 50 percent in the case of tank systems. Unanimous choice was
more prevalent in the head and middle reaches than in tail reaches. This
could be due to the nexus between the village elite (social or political or
economic) and the department officials. Interestingly, political interference is
observed in substantial number of cases, though these institutions are
expected to be apolitical entities. Interferences are reported to be high in
the canal systems when compared to tank systems. Democratic process is
measured in terms of conducting, attending and decision-making process
(collective / majority) in the meetings. GB meetings and EC meetings were
not conducted on a regular basis.21
Table 7: Formation of the WUAs
Formation of Canal Tank
Water User
Associations Head Middle Tail Head Middle Tail
1. Are you Aware of WUA
Yes 49 (98) 26 (68) 48 (77) 44 (98) 51 (96) 50 (96)
No 1 (2) 12 (32) 14 (23) 1 (2) 2 (4) 2 (4)
2. Your role in WUA Activities
Active 13  (26) 10 (26) 11 (18) 9 (20) 4 (8) 8 (15)
Passive 23 (46) 28 (74) 39 (63) 30 (67) 14 (26) 37 (71)
3. Who elected the members to the WUA
Farmers 35 (70) 31 (82) 35 (56) 33 (73) 40 (75) 28 (54)
Presidents 8 (16) 4 (11) 10 (16) 10 (22) 5 (9) 11 (21)
Village Leaders 7 (14) 3 (8) 4 (6) 2 (4) 5 (9) 5 (10)
4. What is the Process of Election
Voting 0 0 0 12 (27) 10 (19) 28 (54)
Nominated 2 (4) 3 (8) 0 2 (4) 1 (2) 0
Unanimous 48 (96) 35 (92) 49 (79) 31 (69) 42 (79) 24 (46)
5. Is there any political interference in the process
Yes 24 (48) 8 (20) 23 (37) 8 (18) 18 (34) 7 (13)
No 26 (52) 31 (80) 39 (63) 37 (82) 35 (66) 45 (87)
Note: Figures in parentheses are respective percentages to the sample households.
If the percentages do not add up to 100, the remaining should be taken as non-
response.
Perceptions of the farmers
When enquired about the functioning of the WUA, the opinion of the sample
farmers is divided. In the case of canal systems middle and tail farmers
seem to be more satisfied than their counter parts in the head reaches
(Table 8). In comparison, tank WUAs seem to be faring better in satisfying
their members. In the case of tanks head and tail reach farmers are more
satisfied than those in the middle reaches. Political interference appears to
be the dominant reason for the member dis-satisfaction, especially in the
canal systems. On the contrary more members are happy about the
performance of the previous Presidents in both the cases and across the22
locations. This indicates that the unanimous selection process of the
Presidents is not very faulty. The limited dissatisfaction with the previous
Presidents was mainly attributed to their incompetence. The difference of
opinion between the WUA and the performance of the president could be
more due to the institutional aspects, like devolution of powers. In the
absence of relevant powers the functioning of WUA cannot be satisfactory,
and the president would perform better given the limited powers.
As revealed in the previous section, here also sample farmers have indicated
that WUA powers are limited to conducting meetings and development of
irrigation channels (Table 8). There are disputes among WUA members of
canal systems regarding works carried out and distribution of water. Greater
number of disputes is reported in the middle reaches when compared to
head and tail reaches and irrigation department plays an important role in
solving the disputes. This indicates that the involvement and influence of
the department has not declined. Interestingly, majority of the farmers do
not have any suggestion for improving the performance of the WUAs, though
some of them expressed the need for cooperation among the farmers. This
clearly reflects the poor awareness and commitment of the farmers, indicating
weak institutional structure in terms of social capital.
Lack of commitment and ownership also comes out clearly from the farmers’
involvement in the maintenance of the systems. Farmer's involvement is
limited to participation in elections, attending general body meetings
(conducted only once) and to some extent water distribution. Their involvement
in the important works like rehabilitation and resettlement and joint assessment
survey is found to be marginal (Table 9). In the case of canal systems, less
than 20 percent of the farmers contributed to the maintenance works, either
in cash or kind. Interestingly, more people contributed in the head reaches
when compared to middle and tail reaches though the differences are marginal.
The reasons for lack of contribution in the case of tank systems are mainly
due to the reason that nobody asked them. This indicates low emphasis on
collecting contributions in the tank systems. In the case of canal systems
three main reasons are indicated i.e., a) no demand, b) lack of money and
c) nobody was contributing. Regarding the maintenance works, majority of
them are not satisfied, especially in the case of canal systems. However,
maintenance works appear to be satisfactory in majority of the cases in tail23
Table 8: Functioning and Powers of the WUAs
Process of Canal Tank
Water Users
Associations Head Middle Tail Head Middle Tail
1. Are you satisfied with the functioning of the WUA
Yes 21(42) 24 (63) 29(47) 35 (78) 17 (32) 39 (75)
No 22 (44) 6 (16) 21 (34) 6 (13) 15 (28) 6 (12)
2. If no, Why
Presently not
functioning Political 4 (8) 1 (3) 4 (6) 0 2 0
Interference 17 (34) 4 (11) 15 (24) 5 (11) 11 (21) 5 (10)
3. Are you happy with Ex. WUA President
Yes 21 (42) 23 (61) 31 (50) 33 (73) 14 (26) 32 (62)
No 5 (10) 15 (39) 8 (13) 3 (7) 3 (6) 13 (25)
4. If No Why
Incapable Person 5 (10) 15 (39) 8 (13) 2 (4) 3 (6) 5 (10)
Selfish 0 0 0 1 (2) 0 2 (4)
5. What are the powers of WUA
Conducting meetings,
training, programme and
make suggestions 18 (36) 7 (18) 12 (19) 4 (9) 6 (11) 2 (4)
They can develop
irrigation channels
like tank, canal etc. 11 (22) 27 (71) 10 (16) 31 (69) 17 (32) 42 (81)
Getting funds
from the government 5 (10) 5 (13) 1 (2) 4 (9) 8 (15) 3 (6)
6. Were there any disputes/conflicts among the WUA members
Yes 13 (26) 19 (50) 15 (24) 0 1 (2) 0
No 13 (26) 18 (47) 24 (39) 37 (82) 18 (34) 44 (85)
7. If Yes, how did they resolve
Involvement of
department 9 (18) 11 (29) 2 (3) 0 4 (8) 3 (6)
President and other
elders 4 (8) 2 (5) 1 (2) 0 0 3 (6)
8. Any suggestions for effective implementation
Equal distribution
of water 1 (2) 1 (3) 12 (19) 2 (4) 5 (9) 9 (17)
Deepening of the
Tank and raising
the height of tank 0 0 0 8 (18) 11 (21) 10 (19)
Needed cooperation and
Coordination by the
farmers 14 (28) 10 (26) 20 (32) 8 (18) 9 (17) 5 (10)
No Suggestions 30 (60) 23 (61) 28 (45) 22 (49) 21(40) 27 (52)
Note: Figures in parentheses are respective percentages to the sample households. If the
percentages do not add up to 100, the remaining should be taken as non-response.24
Table 9: Farmers involvement in Maintenance of WUAs
Maintenance of Canal Tank
WUA
Head Middle Tail Head Middle Tail
1. Contribution to the maintenance of the irrigation System
Yes 10 (20) 7 (18) 10 (16) 14 (31) 19 (36) 18 (35)
No 38 (76) 26 (68) 49 (79) 34 (76) 34 (64) 31(60)
2. If No, Why
No body asked
(no demand) 7 (14) 5 (13) 9 (15) 23 (51) 20 (38) 24 (46)
Not contributed due to
lack of money 8 (16) 5 (13) 15 (24) 1 (2) 1 (2) 3 (6)
Not contributed because
others have not
contributed 9 (18) 5 (13) 12 (19) 1 (2) 2 (4) 1 (2)
3. If yes, what were the forms of Contribution
Cash 2 (4) 4 (11) 7 (11) 6 (13) 10 (19) 5 (10)
Labour 6 (12) 1 (3) 3 (5) 3 (7) 6 (11) 10 (19)
Both 2 (4) 1 (3) 2 (3) 1 (2) 1 (2) 0
4. Is the contribution for maintenance is based on per unit of cropped area
Yes 10 (20) 9 (24) 9 (15) 15 (33) 29 (55) 24 (46)
No 38 (76) 18 (47) 51 (82) 20 (44) 16 (30) 15 (29)
5. Were you satisfied with the maintenance of the system
Yes 16 (32) 10 (26) 31 (50) 24 (53) 28 (53) 32 (62)
No 34 (68) 18 (47) 21 (34) 21 (47) 24 (45) 19 (37)
6. If no, give reasons
No progress in work 13 (26) 9 (24) 10 (16) 9 (20) 12 (23) 9 (17)
Lack of improvement of
the system 5 (10) 5 (13) 4 (6) 3 (7) 1 (2) 3 (6)
President has become
contractor 10 (20) 2 (5) 5 (8) 2 (4) 4 (8) 1 (2)
7. Have you got sufficient water from the Canal/Tank
Yes 32 (64) 27 (71) 31 (50) 14 (31) 19 (36) 15 (29)
No 18 (36) 8 (21) 29 (47) 31 (69) 34 (64) 37 (71)
8. Participation in Election 33 (66) 16 (42) 36 (58) 1 (2) 1 (2) 1 (2)
9. Participation in R&R
works 0 2 (5) 2 (3) 2 (4) 1 (2) 1 (2)
10. Water Distribution 25 (50) 25 (66) 28 (45) 1 (2) 0 0
11. Farmer participating
in GB   50(100) 32 (84) 62 (100) 9 (20) 13 (25) 15 (29)
12. Farmer participating
in Joint Survey 1 (2) 2 (5) 1 (2) 1 (2) 0 0
Note: Figures in parentheses are respective percentages to the sample households.25
reaches. This is true in the cases of canal and tank systems. Despite the
low satisfaction levels majority of the farmers indicated that they are getting
sufficient water in canal systems. However, majority of the farmers in the
tank WUAs are not getting sufficient water. Differences between the locations
indicate that water availability in the tail ends is not satisfactory.
Low availability of water in the tail reaches is also reflected in the quality
of works carried out. Over all less than a quarter of the works are observed
to be of good quality in the case of canal systems, while it is more than 60
percent in the case of tank WUAs. The quality of works declines as one
move from head to tail reaches. However, the better quality works in the
tank WUAs is not translated into improved irrigation facility. This could be
due to the absence of tank renovation and the absence of sufficient water
storage facility. In the case of canal tail reaches substantial number of
farmers (37 percent) have reported improved irrigation facility. But, the
impact on equity in the distribution of water and awareness is marginal.
Political interference appears to be the major demerit of the WUAs, especially
in the canal systems. One important indicator of human capital development
is capacity building at the local level. Here capacity is measured in terms
of training and exposure visits. Only a quarter of the sample farmers have
reported the capacity building activities that too in the canal systems. Capacity
building is less emphasized in the WUAs under tanks. In both canal and
tank systems capacity building is concentrated in the head reaches. The
major activity in capacity building is better water management practices.
Impact of WUAs
The advent of WUAs is expected to have a direct bearing on the water
availability and crop production. In the event of positive impact on these
indicators, there is possibility of secondary impacts like employment, income,
etc. Similarly, some environmental impacts are also expected in the nature
of water logging and salinity. But, attributing all these impacts to WUAs is
difficult. More over, the problem here is that most of the systems suffered
water scarcity during past two years making the impact assessment difficult.
Keeping this in view, here an attempt is made to examine some of the
important impacts from the farmers' perspective. That is sample farmers
were specifically asked whether there is any change in the indicators due
to WUAs.26
Water Availability and Crop production
Better water delivery / distribution is assumed to be an important indicator
of the efficient functioning of any WUA. Water delivery performance can be
estimated on the basis of area irrigated, number of waterings and crop
productivity (here paddy, the main irrigated crop). Between 1997-98 and
2001-02 there has been an increase in the average area irrigated of the
sample households in the canal systems. But, tank WUAs have recorded a
sharp decline. Though, tank irrigation is experiencing a secular decline in
the recent decades, the advent of WUAs could not check this decline.
Added to this is the drought situation. If the 2002-03 figures were to be
taken, even the canal systems would have shown a decline. Between 1997-
98 and 2001-02 the increase in area irrigated is more in the case of middle
and tail reaches indicating that these areas were suffering more water
shortages prior to the advent of WUAs (Table 10)
Table 10: Changes in Area Irrigated (acres/household) during the period
1997-98 to 2001-2002 by Location
Canal Tank All
Year Head Middle Tail Head Middle Tail Head Middle Tail
1997-98 3.81 4.01 2.61 2.71 2.15 1.43 3.30 2.86 2.10
1998-99 3.73 4.06 3.54 1.86 1.56 1.12 2.86 2.52 2.49
1999-00 3.89 4.16 2.79 1.80 1.50 1.05 2.92 2.52 2.04
2000-01 3.93 4.11 2.78 1.77 1.53 0.99 2.93 2.52 2.00
2001-02 3.88 4.21 2.69 1.92 1.55 1.05 2.98 2.57 1.98
2002-03 1.31 2.31 0.57 0.67 0.43 0.52 1.01 1.16 0.55
% Change
(over
2001-02) 1.8 4.8 3.0 -41.1 -38.7 -36.2 -10.7 -11.3 -6.1
Source: Survey data
The adequacy of water reaching the farmers at the end of the canal / tank
i.e., the number of days that sufficient water reached to the tail reaches of
the canal / tank is measured in terms of number of actual waterings in
comparison with water requirement. The analysis from the sample WUAs
indicates that there are differences in the number of irrigations required
and actual number of waterings for paddy, a water intensive crop. The27
difference between different reaches under tank WUAs is more when
compared to canal WUAs. The continuous failure of monsoon may be one
of the reasons for the considerable decline in the available number of
waterings during the period 1997-98 and 2001-02 especially under tanks
(Table 11). The differences between requirement and actual use of water
have narrowed down, especially in tail reaches only after the year 2000-01.
This re-emphasises the improved availability of irrigation water in tail reaches
due to the advent of WUAs.
Table 11: Water Requirement and Availability for Paddy during the
period 1997-98 to 2002-2003.
Water Distribution Canal Tank
Head Middle Tail Head Middle Tail
1997-98
No. of Waterings Required 105 105 103 120 120 120
No. of actual Waterings 104 103 99 107 107 101
1998-99
No. of Waterings Required 108 105 105 120 115 115
No. of actual Waterings 105 103 98 105 100 100
1999-2000
No. of Waterings Required 107 107 100 120 110 115
No. of actual Waterings 105 105 94 108 105 98
2000-2001
No. of Waterings Required 107 105 105 115 110 110
No. of actual Waterings 105 105 104 108 105 100
2001-2002
No. of Waterings Required 105 105 105 120 110 110
No. of actual Waterings 105 105 102 107 103 100
While the impact on area irrigated is more in the middle and tail reaches,
qualitative impact appears to be more in the middle and head reaches.
Qualitative impact is observed in terms of improved productivity of paddy.
Canal systems in all the locations have experienced increased productivity
of paddy, while tank WUAs have experienced negative growth. With in the
canal systems the rate of change is higher in the middle reaches followed
by head and tail reaches. Middle reaches appear to have benefited most28
in quantitative and qualitative terms. However, this may not be directly
attributable to the WUAs, as the productivity changes could be due to
various reasons. For instance, paddy yields have gone up by 25 percent
in Krishna delta during the drought period due to better water management
practices.
In line with the policy of transfer of management responsibilities to WUAs
and making WUAs financially more sustainable, it was recognised that the
water users have to pay the actual O & M costs for the irrigation service.
The results indicate that since 1997, farmers were paying only 3 percent
of the total cost of cultivation (2 to 1.5 percent in total gross value of
output) in different locations viz., head, middle and tail end reaches of the
canal system; while 1 to 1.5 percent of the total cost of cultivation (1.5
percent in total gross value of output) in different locations of the tank
areas. It is also observed that there is a shift from cereal crops to cotton,
castor, other cash crops like papaya, banana and mango especially in
different locations of the tank areas. However, the shift to higher value
crops is driven by prices, and influence of other factors and not entirely due
to the irrigation reforms. In general there is an increase in income from all
sources and in all locations (Reddy, Reddy and Kumar, 2004).
Water Logging and Salinity
One of the major problems faced by the WUAs in the regions of East
Godavari head reaches is the water logging and salinity. Most of the sample
households are aware of this and opined that the WUAs can solve the
problem of water logging and salinity by constructing field channels (6 to 20
percent), drainage channels (4 to 16 percent), and pipelines (2 to 10
percent). From the farmers’ point of view, the major steps to tackle these
problems are clearing the weeds / debris in the field (2 to 14 percent),
digging the drainage channels (2 to 8 percent), and inter plantation through
field / drainage channels for income generation to WUAs (2 to 14 percent).
But many farmers are unhappy that the present WUAs are not showing
much concern to this problem of water and sanitation (4 to 6 percent) and
no proper action with respect to field channels and drainage problems were
taken up by the WUAs (Reddy, Reddy and Kumar, 2004).29
VI Irrigation Reforms in A P: A Missed Opportunity?
It is often argued that the reason for the ills of irrigation management is the
alienation of farmers from the process of planning and implementation.
While substantial amounts of money were spent on the reform process, the
money was used mainly for improving the ailing irrigation systems rather
than making an effort to transfer the irrigation management to farmers. The
main lacunae in the reforms are at two levels: a) conceptual or formulation
level, and b) implementation level. At the formulation level, tank and canal
systems are treated as similar in fund allocations. While the degenerated
tanks needed more allocation for rehabilitation, the allocations under WUAs
were based on the command area. This has led to under funding and
resulted in little improvement in the tank systems per se and availability of
water. For, unless water storage of the tanks is improved there is no gain
in improving the distribution systems. Our analyses clearly brought out that
there is hardly any improvement in the tank systems. And farmers are
asking for more funds towards works pertaining to tank deepening and
strengthening the bunds. Another issue in this regard is that groundwater
resources, the single largest source of irrigation, are completely left out of
the purview of the WUAs. That is irrigation reforms are neither comprehensive
nor followed an integrated water resource management approach.
At the implementation level, an important aspect revealed is the 'elite capture'
of the WUAs. As in the case of most of the parallel institutions initiated in
A P (Reddy and Jenkinns, 2004), forward castes and large farmers are
occupying the position of president disproportionate to their actual population.
This is mainly due to the reason that they are loosing their positions in the
constitutional bodies of PRIs due to the positive dissemination policy.
Moreover, parallel institutions are financially stronger when compared to
PRIs. All the rights in WUAs are given to land owning and tenant cultivators
to the neglect of land less and other water users such as land less women,
fishermen, etc. This denies equitable access to a common pool resource.
As a result, the huge public investments in this sector benefit only a section
of the community, though in majority. Equal distribution of water rights is
seen as vital for sustaining water institutions (Deshpande and Reddy, 1990).
The main idea of initiating WUAs in A P, is that these institutions would be
apolitical and focus on delivery. Though elections were not conducted in30
their true spirit in majority of the cases, political interference is observed in
a substantial number of cases. Though regular conduction of elections may
go against the basic philosophy of participatory development and
management through political divide, the nomination process facilitates 'elite
capture'. As a result, these institutions in their present form tend to dilute
the social capital rather than strengthening it.
Reforms also focus on financial sustainability through price reforms. Though
water rates were increased initially by 3 times, they are still short of O&M
expenditure. Though user contribution of 15 percent is inherent / included
in the PIM act there is no evidence of any contribution from farmers. In fact,
there are no efforts to collect this contribution. The main reason is that little
effort is made in the direction of strengthening the institutional structures.
Awareness, involvement, commitment and contribution to the cause are
lacking at the primary stakeholder level. This is mainly due to the fact that
irrigation department is not willing to devolve powers.
Though some benefits in terms of increased area under irrigation in canal
systems and improved quality of irrigation is evident, the sustainability of
these benefits is rather uncertain in the absence of efficient institutional
structures. While it appears that an opportunity to build stronger and
sustainable irrigation institutions is floundered, the opportunity is not totally
lost, as the WUAs are still in place. It is observed that formal institutions are
rigid and rule bound4. Equity in the management and distribution of water
is not addressed. No proper incentive (positive and negative) structures
were designed and placed to support rule compliance.
Post Script
Since the completion of our fieldwork number of important changes pertaining
to WUAs as well political dynamics at the State level have taken place. At
the time of fieldwork the status of WUAs was that second term elections
were postponed due to various reasons such as lack of auditing of accounts
of the WUAs. The actual reason could be political, as we found in our study
that auditing of accounts was carried out in majority of the cases.
Nevertheless, special officers were posted in the place of Presidents to
4 For a detailed discussion on formal vis a vis informal institutions see Reddy, 2002.31
carry out the functions of the WUAs. Subsequently, elections were conducted
in 13 districts during October 2003. In nine districts, elections were not
conducted, as there was no water in the canals. The election process has
been changed substantially. Now the term of the President is only for two
years. Every two years elections will be conducted for one third of the
posts. Election procedure is also made simple by raising hands or voting
slips instead of formal secret ballot system. This is mainly to cut the costs.
The new government appears to be keen in continuing the irrigation reforms.
A meeting of the WUA Presidents (33 newly elected) representing all the
districts was organized during August 2004 to discuss the modalities for
improving the functioning of WUAs. The meeting was attended by the Minister
for major irrigation, indicating the commitment of the new government to
take forward the reforms. One of the main demands of the WUA Presidents
was to revert back to the election procedures of the original act 1997. Their
main contention was that 2 years is too short a period to make any
meaningful contribution. It is proposed that General Body (GB) should co-
opt 2 women members to the EC in the case of major and medium irrigation
and 1 women member in the case of minor irrigation. They also propose
among other things to enhance the financial viability of the WUAs through
plantation and horticultural crops on common riverbeds, canal banks, etc.
Further, social forestry can be taken up on the encroached lands. They
also demand that the WUA should conduct the auction of fisheries. This
may go against the interests of the fishing community. Presidents of small
tanks of 100-150 acres are demanding more funds for repairs.  The co-
operation and co-ordination between president, EC and irrigation engineers
should be strengthened. The quantity and distribution of water shall be
carried out by PCs, DCs and WUAs through general body depending on
the availability of water. In the absence of PC/DC, WUA be held responsible
for water distribution. Laskars should be placed under the direct control of
the WUAs.
Interestingly, the federation of WUA Presidents put forth two peculiar
demands. One is delinking of WUAs from the village PRIs. Two, WUAs
should be represented in the legislative council (proposed to be revived in
AP). These two demands reflect the interests of the Presidents in making
the WUAs as local power centers. The rationale for the first demand is that32
in canal regions WUAs are often larger than the village panchayts and
hence PRI cannot control WUAs. Another reason could be that the elite
dominance in WUAs should go unchallenged from the local PRIs. Their
interests appear to be more in terms of acquiring political clout than to
demand more powers to strengthen the institution itself. While the government
has not addressed the demands and requests in the context of institutional
strengthening, their political demands are brought in though in a different
manner. A draft bill is being proposed (accepted by the cabinet) to amend
the 1997 act. According to this amendment, one male and a woman member
representing the gram panchayat will be appointed to the minor irrigation
WUAs. District collectors will appoint MPs, MLAs and Mandal president
concerned to the project committee of the medium irrigation WUAs. In the
case of large irrigation project WUAs, the government will appoint the MP,
the MLA, the ZP chairperson, the district collector and the mandal president
concerned. These co-opted members may not have voting rights. With this,
it appears that the politicization process of the WUAs is complete.33
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